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To any fellow Latin American (especially to a Bolivian, a Colombian, a Venezuelan,
a Peruvian, or an Ecuadorian), the mention of Simon Bolivar's name echoes a feeling of
familiar pride and historic nostalgia for a lost ideal. The fundamentals of the integra-
tion process in Latin America were Simon Bolivar's (El Libertador) political and social
dreams. He thought of a unified Latin America as a powerful political unit, to not only
guard citizens from the dangers of foreign powers, but to also promote a sound dispute
resolution process within the integration of those countries. Regardless of the unsuccess-
ful projects, from the Confederation to La Gran Colombia (the unification of Colombia,
Venezuela, and Ecuador into one solid entity), his ideas stuck with the people in charge
and with the masses that followed. There were numerous attempts for an integration
process at the time, but, instead of a political one, the countries have since then taken
the path of the economy to ensure the dream comes true.
The world and the continent in the last decades have undergone fundamental
changes. The globalization process in the economy and in society is a reality and another
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natural phenomenon that is a given at this time. The global imperative is driven by a
confluence of different forces,' from the governmental policies to the forces of technolog-
ical change, especially in the fields of transportation, communications, and new methods
of production.2 The vanishing of communism and the veneration of a capitalist society
are elements of a worldwide culture. It is within this "globalization' 3 process that all the
countries are seeking alliances in order to intertwine their trade and cooperate in polit-
ical and social issues that arise within their interaction. Economic blocks are the order
of the day, and the integration process is evolving toward an open spectrum of exchange
in goods and services.' The barrier of sovereignty has diminished as different countries
are involved in each other's policies with the multiple regional, sub-regional, and bilat-
eral agreements. In this context, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mercado del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR), Central American Common Market (CACM),
the Group of Three (G-3), and the Andean Community have developed agreements of
trade between countries and have become an issue to be addressed when attempting to
form a global economy.
Among new trade pacts being signed, revitalization of some old ones, and extension
of others to reach new associates among the different continents, the rise of trade agree-
ments in Latin America must be given due attention. It is also of primary importance to
understand what regional integration means and why it has become the trend during the
last decade. Regional and subregional integration are primarily instruments to achieve
economic improvements in developing countries. It is intended to facilitate structural
change by promoting economic diversification through industrialization.' No countries
in Latin America have decided to stand on their own. Trade agreements are a condition
precedent to that of achieving effective competitiveness, increase gaining power in for-
eign markets, and attracting new investments. 6 To understand integration at a regional
level, let us differentiate between a free trade agreement and a more developed customs
union. The first establishes a non-tariff regime among the contracting parties, though
each one of them has its own policy when dealing with the rest of the world. A customs
umr: .... the ofth hand pro;1e the -rfai-n of q rnmmnn tnriff fnr th gnods qnd
1. For a discussion on the factors driving the globalization process, see Michale Mussa, Factors
Driving Global Economic Integration, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Symposium (Aug. 25, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2000/082500.htm.
2. See Renato Ruggiero, The Road Ahead: International Trade Policy in the Era of the WTO,
Address to the Fourth Sylvia Ostry Lecture in Ottawa, Canada (May 28, 1996), available at
http://www.imf.orglenglish/newa-e/sprr-e/ottawae.htm.
3. For a discussion on globalization, see Stanley Fisher, Globalization: Valid Concerns? Com-
ments to Closing Panel Discussion Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Sympo-
sium (Aug. 26, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/O82600.htm.
4. See Hector Maldonado Lira, Thirty Years of Andean Integration: Balance and Perspectives,
Andean Community General Secretariat (1999), available at http://www.comunidadandina.
org/30anios/ana_CLLM.htm.
5. Colin L. McCarthy, Regional Integration of Developing Countries at Different Levels of Economic
Development-Problems and Prospects, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994).
6. Miguel Otero-Lathrop, MERCOSUR and NAFTA: The Need for Convergence, 4 NAFTA: L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 116 (1998).
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services entering the union outside the members. It is the latter for which the Andean
Community longs.7
The aim of this article is to focus on the establishment and achievements of the
Andean Community, its current agreement with some MERCOSUR countries, and a
glimpse at its impact on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
II. Latin American Integration: The Andean Community
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION
The Andean Community is a subregional organization created in 1969, with
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador as its members.' This union became
possible under the Latin America Free Commerce Association (ALALC) Resolutions 202
and 203 that regulate the basis for a trade agreement among the members. By 1973,
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador were following import substitution and protec-
tionism as trade strategies (strategies that contradict the initiatives of the newly-elected
Chilean government who initiated a trade liberalization process).
Chile followed the path less traveled by Latin American countries. For decades,
Chile lived with nationalization and big governments carried on by the bureaucracy,
which impacted investment. Furthermore, state over-regulation, interventionism, and the
productive process of the state-owned enterprises are inefficient. Chile started a trade
liberalization process that focused on reform for the private sector participation in the
economy, accomplished by a series of privatizations of Chilean state-owned enterprises.
Pursuant to irreconcilable differences with the Andean Community directives, Chile
withdrew from its participation in the Community in 1976. 9 However, five members
still existed because Venezuela had already joined the Andean Community consolidating
their integration in a closer geographical context.
The Andean Community's objective is to establish and promote economic devel-
opment of the members. This is accomplished through economic, as well as social,
integration. The Community seeks to increase its bargaining power in the international
economy and to strengthen the subregional solidarity with the final purpose of procuring
better living for the inhabitants of the subregion."l
Through its evolution, the members opted for an alternative to underdevelopment.
They understand that integration is not just an economic process; it is also a social and
cultural venture. The subregional integration has expanded the scope of a free trade
agreement going beyond the traditional issues of tariff and non-tariff barriers. From the
7. For discussions on levels of economic integration, see ALI M. EL-AGRAA ET AL., ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION WORLDWIDE (St. Martin's Press 1997).
8. For more information, visit the Andean Community web page available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org.
9. Chile withdrew from the Andean Pact in 1976, as a consequence of the Resolution 102
adopted by the Cartagena Agreement Commission, because of the different political views of
this member regarding the economic model; the four members left favored a protectionist
model, while Chile favored a more liberal one.
10. See Cartagena Agreement, May, 1969, art. 1 (signed in Bogotd, Colombia), available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/tratprot/acuerdo.htm.
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beginning, it has addressed education" and labor integration, 2 as well as established a
forum for dispute resolution within the community. It was with this one objective in
mind that in 1983 the Andean Court of Justice was implemented.
B. THE DRAWBACKS AND THE REVITALIZATION
Notwithstanding the attempts to achieve an international projection, the close econ-
omy and protectionism that underlie the Andean Community directives held it back.
13
There was a new economical reality in the world that leaned toward liberalization in
international commerce and foreign investment. The Andean members tried implement-
ing it by making the foreign capital treatment more flexible. But the slow decision-
making process, the breach of the obligations of the community, the lack of involvement
of Bolivia, and the 1981 "war" between Ecuador and Peru forecast a negative outcome
in the integration process.'
4
To revitalize the process in 1987, the members enacted the Quito Protocol' to pro-
vide the Community with a less rigid process than the one contained in the Cartagena
Agreement. The modification to the Cartagena Agreement was a reality check for the
members. In its development, different sectors of the civil society were involved: gov-
ernment, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, politicians, and working class people interested in
the future of the Andean Community. This measure provided the fuel that the process
needed to continue its course (no longer a stranger to the obstacles in sight).' 6
After the Quito Protocol adoption, there was a need for new compromises for divest-
ing goods of tariff barriers and enacting a common tariff, rules of origin, etc., in order
to be in tune with the reality of the development of the international community. In
this context, the Andean Community adopted Decision 330 in 1992,17 which opened the
commerce by eliminating subsidies and incentives of the intraregional exports, stripping
the trade policy of government interventionism and giving it an air of equality and free
trade among the entrepreneurs of each country. However, as anticipated, the process had
its obstacles.
11. See Andean Community, Andres Bello Agreement for the Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Integration (1970), available at http://www.cab.int.co.
12. See Andean Community, Simon Rodriguez Agreement for Socio-labor Integration (1973).
13. See Jose A. Garcia- Belaunde, Bolivar Dream: From the Andean Federation to the Andean Com-
munity, in THE DREAM OF BOLIVA: THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE
INTEGRATION OF THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES, Biarritz (Sept. 27-28, 2000) (trans.), available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/document/estu/docest.htm.
14. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out, the Andean Community progressed in three
aspects during this period. It consolidated its technological policy, with the approval of the
Industrial Property Directives, and it developed the first Andean Programs in Technologi-
cal Development. It also approved the Petro-chemical Industry program, Decision 91, and
defined the Terrestrial System of Andean Roads.
15. See Quito Protocol, signed in Quito, Ecuador (1987).
16. The Andean Community members suffer the effects of the international financial crisis and
the political adversities within each member; nonetheless, they maintain the course of the
community.
17. COMUNIDAD ANDINA, QUINCUAGESIMOCTAVO PERIODO ORDINARIO DE SESIONES DE LA COMI-
SION (1992), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d330.htm.
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In 1992, Peru's participation diminished because of a negative export/import rate
related to the other Andean Community members.18 Due to its importation of tariff-free
petroleum from Colombia and the lower price of industrial products coming from the
members compared to its own, a noncompetitive market for Peru and no participation
in the Free Trade Area until 1997 resulted.' 9 Still today, Peru is not included in the
Common External Tariff that reduced duties on goods imported from third countries.
Furthermore, Bolivia's obligations are not binding, which gives the whole process an air
of instability and lack of commitment.
C. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Regardless of the slow pace, and keeping in mind the ultimate goal (the com-
mon market), the Andean Community has characterized itself as the existence of
well-developed communitarian institutions with supranational authority.2 Only well-
established mechanisms and forums will allow it to grow into a common market and
to achieve the unity required for facing the challenges of the international economy.
Integration requires judicial, political, and technical bodies able to manage diverse issues
and address the globalization process. Institutions do not have to guarantee the process
per se but have to strengthen the position of the Andean Community in the world, with
third parties giving stability to the obligations undertaken by it and providing certainty
for investment. With this in mind, strengthening the Community's institutions was
achieved in 1996 with the Trujillo Protocol, which establishes the Andean Presidential
Council as the supreme administrative organ and the Andean Council of Foreign
Ministers with normative, as well as supervisory, faculties. This protocol also provides
for an Integrated System, in which all the organs will meet in order to determine the
policies of the Community.
Additionally, the members enacted the Cochabamba Protocol in 1996 and the Sucre
Protocol in 1997.21 The latter intends to consolidate the integration process by establish-
ing programs to be developed among the members regarding liberalizing and promoting
services. 2 2 It further entrusts the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers with the function
18. See ANDEAN COMMUNITY DECISION 321 (1992), available at http://cornjunidadandina.org
normativa/dec/d32 1.htm.
19. ANDEAN COMMUNITY DECISION 414 (1997), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/
normativa/dec/d414.htm. Peru reached an agreement with the other members of the Andean
Community for its full incorporation into the Free Trade Area. In effect, the Commission,
through Decision 414, approved a tariff reduction schedule that became operational on
August 1, 1997 and will conclude in 2005.
20. Supranationality of the Andean Community decisions implied a direct applicability of the
rule of law and a supremacy over national law declared in the Treaty Creating the Andean
Court of Justice of the Agreement of Cartagena.
21. Available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/andetrie4.htm.
22. See General Framework of Principles and Rules for Liberalizing the Trade in Services in
the Andean Community, Comm'n of the Andean Cmt'y, Decision 439 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D463e.htm; Provisions Regulat-
ing the Integration and Liberalization of the Trade in Telecommunications Services in
the Andean Community, Comm'n of the Andean Cmt'y, Decision 462, available at
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of developing an external common policy. On the other hand, the Cochabamba Proto-
col centers on strengthening and adapting the Andean Community Court of Justice by
widening its jurisdiction.23 The existence of a rule of law, based on legality and different
from that of the members that compose it, makes the legal process an integrated one.
Additionally, there are several rights of action that the members can follow to: void the
decisions that contradict the rule of law, punish breaches of the communitarian obliga-
tions, and guarantee a harmonious interpretation of the decisions and resolutions of the
administrative and normative bodies. The Cochabamba Protocol allows for the partici-
pation of private parties. Moreover, the Andean Community Court of Justice may serve
as an arbitrator to ensure proper interpretation and application of contracts and agree-
ments among the Integrated System bodies or with third parties. Private parties may also
seek arbitration before the Court or before the General Secretariat of the Community if
regarding technical aspects.
In spite of the obstacles that the Community has faced, amongst them the Peruvian
government's diminishing participation, the financial crisis undergone by the members,
the political conflicts that they are facing, and the historical problems between Colombia-
Venezuela, the members have still kept their agenda in mind and close at hand.
The results of a stable economy are reflected in its openness to the world and stability
of the fundamental indicators. One of the outstanding achievements within the Andean
Community is the growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 746.69 percent,
which reflects the improvement in the income per household that grew five times from
U.S.$516 in 1970 to U.S.$2,681 in 1998. The exports to the world have also increased
considerably. They went from U.S.$5.38 million in 1970 to a high of U.S.$38.679 million
in 1998, which means that the exports to the world grew seven times in the thirty
years since the establishment of the Community. This shows that an increase of the sub-
regional exports to the world in 1990 accounted for 4.2 percent of the total exports to
the world and, in 1999, notwithstanding the economic crisis, it accounted for 9.1 percent
of the total.
thus achieving the transition from a Free Trade Agreement 24 to a Customs Union.
25
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/d462e.htm; Regime for the Development
and Integration of Tourism in the Andean Community, Comm'n of the Andean Cmt'y, Decision
463, available at http://www.comunidadandina.orglingles/treaties/dec/d463e.htm.
23. See Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, Mar. 10, 1996, amended
by Cochabamba Protocol, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/
andetrie2.htm.
24. The Andean Free Trade Area has a characteristic that sets it aside from all other integration
movements in the Americas today: all of the products in its tariff universe have been dereg-
ulated. Therefore, the List of Exceptions that is common to other integration systems does
not exist.
25. The goal of liberalizing services by 2005 is also ambitious, but the provisions the Andean
Community has adopted in that regard are among the hemisphere's most advanced, even
going beyond those of the FTAA. Alan Fairlie Reinoso, Peru's Open Regionalism and the
Andean Community (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/
alan23-1-01.htm (this article is a summary of the last chapter of a report about the Andean
Community prepared by the IDB and INTAL).
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The liberalization of the transportation and communication services, the increase in
manufactured goods exchange, and the increase of foreign investment were all results
of the transition. 26 Thus, the intracommunitarian exports grew forty-eight times, from
U.S.$111 million in 1970 to U.S.$5.333 billion in 1999, which accounts for 13.78 percent
of the total exports with other zones.2 ' The Andean market achieved great increments in
the 1990s. The intraregional exchange of goods and services compared to the exchange
with the rest of the world grew from 2 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 1998. It is
important to point out that the main exports in the intracommunitarian exchange had
been manufactured goods (90 percent of the total exports), while the exports with the
rest of the world constituted basic products.
Another indicator that must be taken into account is foreign investment that went
from U.S.$3.4 million in 1970 to U.S.$29.83 million in 1997, which accounts for an
increase of 777 percent from the enactment of the Cartagena Agreement almost three
decades later earlier. Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia receive the majority of the direct invest-
ment due mainly to the privatizations process that the countries are carrying out with
their states' own enterprises. Ecuador, even though it has not established a privatization
process, has also been a recipient of large investments and has maintained its stability
since 1993, oscillating between 2.5 percent and 3.2 percent of the GDP. 8 With respect to
transportation services, the aerial transport market within the region grew 400 percent,
from 128 flights per week in 1970 to 500 in 1998. The destined cities tripled since 1991,
and are not limited to capital cities. The terrestrial transport saw an increase in trucker
companies from ten in 1987 to more than 100 by 1994. The elimination of the reserve
seal in maritime transport reduced the cost and increased the frequency of trips and the
number of companies providing the service.29
The progress in imports/exports within the Community has become an incentive
for the members to go forward. Regardless of the political and economic circumstances
of the members, the Andean Community has achieved various accomplishments that
reinforce its position as a strong initiative in Latin America, as the indicators mentioned
above show. Nonetheless, it has not yet achieved the intracommunitarian exchange for
which the members hope.
26. The Andean Community's approval of the establishment of the Simon Bolivar Andean Satellite,
to be operated by an Andean multinational, in which businessmen of all the members are to
participate, deserves attention. The approval of Andean Community Commission Decisions 479
and 480 complemented and enlarged the regulatory framework for the establishment, opera-
tion, and development of the Andean satellite systems established in August 1996 by Decision
395. Decision 395 is available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d395.htm.
Decision 479 is available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d479.htm. Deci-
sion 480 is available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d480.htni.
27. The Andean Community statistics are available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/
statis.htm.
28. Andean Community General Secretariat, Evolution of the Andean Economies and Its Competi-
tiveness (Sept. 1999) (trans.), available at http://www.comunidadandina.orgestadistica8.htm.
29. Manuel Jos6 Cardenas, Ambassador of Colombia to Uruguay, The Andean Community Pro-
cess is the Most Advanced One of the Region, Montevideo (Aug. 31, 1999) (trans.), available
at http://www.comunidadandina.org/30anios/ana-cardenas2.htm.
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D. WHAT MUST BE ADDRESSED?
In 1999, the members agreed to achieve common market status by 2005. This agree-
ment will include: free trade of goods and services, free flow of capital, and free mobility
of people. This, however, is not an easy task. It will require the abolishment of any trade
obstacles among the members and will require the perfection of the customs union and
the adoption of a more efficient common external tariff. More importantly, all the Com-
munity members must be engaged full-time in this accord. If things go according to
plan, strengthened by the members' efforts, the common market will affect the develop-
ment of the members' economies and increase production and employment. If it turns
out to be positive, the integration will result in a social, political, as well as economic,
answer to the different crisis that each member faces.
Considering the social element, the Andean Presidents at the 1999 Cartagena Sum-
mit decided to put in place a social agenda that would center on the creation and
promotion of jobs, education, health, and housing." It is important to keep in mind
that despite the unit view that the international community may have of the countries
that compose the Andean Community, each one is different and unique in history, cul-
ture, political issues, and economic status. As an example of this, one may suggest the
"dollarization" of Ecuador's economy,3 the political environment in Peru, the political
and social conflicts in Colombia, and so on.
In order to form a real union between the members, the social agenda would have
to be a central point in the debate for the future of the Community. Other factors
that play an important role in the future of the integration process are associated with
foreign investments. All the members will have to liberalize their foreign investment laws,
even though their inherent political or economic struggles have held them back from
capitalizing on normative innovations.
Additionally, these struggles impact the free movement of persons, with internal
conflicts that some of the members, especially Colombia, face daily. Aside from Colom-
hian violence, which everyone wants to see come to an end, there must be a total
agreement between the members if Latin America is to become a social, economic,
and political block. In this particular instance, Venezuela's position of being the only
member of the Community that requires its partners to obtain entry visas is not
acceptable.
There is, however, another worry. If the free movement of labor is accomplished, the
exodus of thousands of people from the Colombian job market will affect other mar-
kets. Due to Colombia's internal political conflict, the members worry and wonder how
much more forward they should go. An aspect that must be addressed by the Andean
Community bodies is civil society participation. Lack of knowledge and involvement in
30. See Andean Community General Secretariat, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org
ingles/agenda.htm.
31. For a further analysis on the impact of dollarization, see Press Release, Dollarization No
Obstacle to the Formation of the Andean Common Market, According to Ecuador (Aug. 25,
2000), available at http://www.comunidadandina.orgingles/press/np25a-8-OO.htm.
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the process is a deficit in the integration that has to be solved through the governmental,
nongovernmental, and civil society organizations.
32
Another important characteristic of the Andean Community is its intention to
engage in negotiations as a block trying to reduce existing freelance agreements. In 1999,
the members established the parameters for a common foreign policy33 that will enhance
the position of the Community in Latin America, where democracy and implementation
of the Andean Community's decisions are at its core. The Council of Foreign Ministers
is in charge of such a task, giving it the faculties to suspend a member if the forum it
uses to settle a dispute is not within the rights of action given by the Andean Commu-
nity directives. Some of the issues that the common foreign policy must address in the
present circumstances involve drug trafficking, corruption, consolidation of the demo-
cratic process, and security in the members. Nowadays, the Community has a unison
voice at the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and in negotiations with
MERCOSUR and the European Union.
E. CONCLUSION
The Andean Community countries have indeed kept their objectives. The level of
welfare among the population has increased not only in the economical aspect, but
also in the cultural and social one. The Community must continue to seek a sustained
development by reinforcing equity and well being through economic integration. Not
everything is an achievement as seen above; the community has faced a continuum of
challenges but it is on the track of a true custom union.
With the Andean Community integration process charging ahead, the culmination
of the Customs Union by 2005 and the full liberalization of services and markets, all
with the main objective of achieving a Common Market on the horizon, can we pro-
claim that we are on the right track? Looking at the European experience,34 one has
to look at the process with a positive attitude. The condition precedents are present,
there are no tariff obstacles for goods and production factors, and there is a certain
degree of harmonization among the members in economic policy. The reaffirmation
of the Andean Community as a major negotiating block is inevitable. Its trade agree-
ments with the European Union, CARICOM (the Caribbean Community), Panama,
and the United States strengthen the Andean Community's position in the great global
economy.
Summing up, the Andean Community has had many accomplishments so far. At
the very least, it is more fully developed than the process of other Latin American blocks
with which it is negotiating.3" Recently, the export/import rate has increased among the
32. Interview by Gabriel Sanchez with Andean Community General Secretariat, Alegrett, printed
in Revista Javeriana de Columbia (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.comunidadandina.
org/3Oanios/english/ana-alegrett.htm [hereinafter Interview].
33. Decision 458 is available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d458e.htm.
34. The world's most advanced integration experience-that of Europe-was built up stage-by-
stage, from the agreement on coal and steel and the customs union to the monetary union
through the construction of the European social model and a Europe of European citizens.
See Reinoso, supra note 25.
35. Id.
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members, which was one of the main objectives of the integration since it has opened
markets that were previously closed to each member of the Community. As a union, it
has achieved an international presence that has allowed for several agreements with the
world's most powerful economies. This could not have been done individually because
of the lack of bargaining power and the weakness of each economy. It is important that
the Community charge ahead and emphasize the social aspects that have developed so
far, so as to not lose thirty years of hard work.
The desire for the process to succeed has broken down economic barriers and polit-
ical schemes that have held the countries back. To maintain the path of success, the
integration process must leave behind the negotiation table of the General Secretariat
of the Andean Community and establish itself among the civil societies. It is they who
will take advantage of the free flow of capital, goods, services, and people and who in
each activity will enhance the economy of their countries. Without public opinion on its
side and knowledge of the advantages for the entrepreneurs and people, the process may
breed thousands of agreements among the countries and build a strong set of institutions
that no one will access.
As Gustavo Magarifios stated:
To judge an integration process, one must exercise a collective conscience test, in which every-
one must participate, not only those who act or abstain to do so, also those who opinionate,
because the latter ones assume a great responsibility in developing a critical function, and
sometimes, not always, forget that is easier to criticize and comment on a novel than to write
it. And all (the participants) are not just the governments, as institutional bodies titular of
political responsibility that emanates of its own will expressed in the final and solemn act
of the signing of a Treaty the International; all are also official employees of different levels,
that they must carry out the necessary actions for the execution of the programs established,
not with a nationalistic extreme criterion that makes of the negotiation a mere file to obtain
an egoistic benefit for its country, but immerse of the concept of which they are within a
communitarian effort destined to put into operation a society of States governed by princi-
ples of fairness and mutual understanding; the technical and administrative employees ot the
Organization; who must extirpate of their daily activity all ingredient of comfortable bureau-
cracy to invigorate it with an almost messianic sense of the enterprise in which they have the
privilege and the honor to participate; the industrialists who do not have to confuse their
particular benefit, (notwithstanding its) legitimism, with the national interest and those who
he corresponds to replace the philosophy of now by an exact conscience of which in integra-
tion he is called on to play and to exert an economic function of historical projection and
deep social content; and finally, that which in different spheres, intellectual journalism circles,
Universities, unions, etc., often conform that erratic, irregular, arbitrary and unreasonable
inclined to commit errors, public opinion, frequently joined by myths and bad information
and an innate resistance to the innovation but that, nevertheless, is equipped with an infinite
wisdom to judge men and facts. 36
36. ROBERTO PROAIO RIVAS, THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: THIRTY YEARS OF HISTORY, ACCOM-
PLISHMENTS AND FRUSTRATIONS, chap. IV (Colegio de Economistas de Quito Primera edi-
ci6n ed., 1999) (trans.) (citing GUSTAVO MAGARIIOS, ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN THE
AMERICAS, available at http://www.unites.uquam.ca/gric/Amerregio-biblio l.htm, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/30anios/anaC4LP.htm.
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Ill. Latin American Integration: The Andean Community
and MERCOSUR
Since its inception in 1991, MERCOSUR37 has positioned itself right behind the
European Union and NAFTA.38 Despite its recent formation, MERCOSUR, compared to
the other trade agreements that exist within Latin America, has achieved recognition,
stability, and support from the international economy. It is nothing to be startled by since
it involves the two most powerful economies in South America: Brazil and Argentina.
In its 10-year history, MERCOSUR has consolidated itself as a customs union. It has
managed to eliminate most of the trade barriers in goods and services, it has procured
the establishment of a common external tariff,39 and most interesting of all, MERCOSUR
has developed its goals at a rapid pace, despite the historic rivalry of the members
involved.
Even without the variety of institutions of custom unions, like the European Union
and the Andean Community, the minimalist approach of MERCOSUR has allowed it to
distribute free flow of goods, services, people, and capital."0 Because of its position in the
global economy and the positive comments received from the international community,
an economic integration among this subregional community will hold an approximate
16,589,015 square kilometers and will house more than 331 million people. With US$1.3
million in commerce, MERCOSUR's progress constitutes a great forming block for the
future of the individual economies within it, as well as for the whole region surrounding
it. These characteristics also help to enhance the bargaining position of an important
region in its future role in the FTAA and other economic agreements.
It is an ambitious process that will encircle almost all Hispanic South America41 and
encompass nine different complementary economies. Trade between MERCOSUR and
the Andean Community is significant. Together they-exchanged a total US$5.82 million
in the year 2000, an increase of 29.4 percent over 1999's results of US$4.5 million.42
The Andean Community exports to MERCOSUR account for 3.8 percent of the total
FOB exports to the world, and its CIF imports conversely from MERCOSUR provided
7 percent of the Andean countries' total imports. A negative trade balance resulted for
the Andean Community.
43
37. Created pursuant to the Asuncion Treaty in March 1991, under the ALADI Treaty, art. 7,
available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snornormativa/asuncion.htm.
38. For a discussion of MERCOSUR, see Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR as an Instrument of Devel-
opment, 3 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 53 (1997).
39. Otero-Lathrop, supra note 6, at 116.
40. Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR: The Emergence of a Working System of Dispute Resolution, 6
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 255 (2000).
41. The exception is Chile; it is an associate to MERCOSUR and has multiple bilateral agreements
with most of the Andean Community members.
42. Uncas Fernindez, GAZETA MERCANTIL LATINOAMERICANA (Mar. 12-18, 2001) (trans.), avail-
able at http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/articulos/gazetal4%2D01.htm.
43. SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY, THIRD COUNTRY TRADE ANDEAN
COMMUNITY-MERCOSUR TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1969-1999 (May 2000), available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/stadis/mercan.htn.
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In 1998, the Andean Pact members and their MERCOSUR counterparts brought
forward the Framework Agreement 44 for the creation of a free trade agreement between
the two sub-regional agreements, to be carried out in two phases. First, they will start
with tariff preferences based on preferences already established among the countries that
belong to each group and to which new products may be added, and then they will
follow with a free trade agreement. Notwithstanding the initiation of the negotiation for
tariff preferences and the multiple meetings, based on a negotiation formula product by
product, 45 the lack of community institutions in MERCOSUR jeopardizes a block-to-
block economic integration. Since there is no body that can speak for its members and
because its decisions have to be adopted by the domestic law before being effective,
46
the agreement was not reached, but there was an extension of the pre-existing tariff
preferences that kept the doors open for future negotiation.
The central point of the framework agreement is the Free Trade Agreement amongst
the two organisms. It is important to understand, however, that in order to achieve the
exchange rate wanted, the channels of access to each country (physical as well as political)
must be open. South America lacks a key ingredient of integration: a well-developed
transportation system in the region. Contrary to the European Union's superior train
schedules and in-town transportation systems, members of the Andean Pact would have
a really long and difficult trip to one of MERCOSUR's countries. This problem creates
an obstacle to the integration, and it must be a primary focus in future negotiations.47
Transportation is not only expensive, but it is also a priced commodity, and South
America lacks an efficient distribution method, which hinders countries from free trade
and tourism. Additionally, the lack of judicial precedent in MERCOSUR, compared to
the highly developed Andean Community bodies and its regulations, forces the need
for an extensive rule of law to be established between the countries, and to make the
integration possible in a legal framework.
In 1999, Brazil took the first baby step by individually cosigning with the Andean
Community the Agreement for Economic Complementation. 4' This stepping-stone in
the path towards a free trade agreement in the South American region achieved the first
phase of the Framework Agreement between Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and
44. Signed in Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 16, 1998. Protocolized in ALADI as AAP No. 11
signed under article 14 of the TM 80, available at http://www.mercosur.com/es/info/
acuerdomercosur comunidadandina.jsp.
45. See Interview, supra note 32.
46. Recent Developments in the Andean Pact affecting North American Investors and Exporters, 4
LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP. 2 (1996).
47. The Andean Community has enacted, through Decisions 271 and 277, the 1990 Andean
Road System that links up the member countries by means of a road network stretch-
ing over 378,000 kilometers. It also possesses more than 10,000 kilometers of rail-
roads and a river network that interconnects some Amazon cities. Andean Community
General Secretariat, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d271.htm;
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d277.htm.
48. Acts, Declarations, and Agreements of the CAN (trans.), available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/acuCanBra.htm.
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Peru.49 Argentina followed Brazil's example in 2000."0 These Agreements for Economic
Complementation seek to abolish tariff and non-tariff obstacles to trade and they procure
National Treatment consideration for the goods and services originated in the participant
countries."' They have created a dispute resolution process to resolve controversies, if they
arise.52 These Agreements also leave the door open for the accession of Latin American
members of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).53 Nowadays, the Andean
Community is in the midst of starting negotiations with Uruguay and Paraguay.
The individual attempts of the MERCOSUR countries to develop agreements with
the Andean Community are clear from the September 2000 meeting in Brazil. The whole
region longs for a South American regional agreement. On September 1, 2000, after
a meeting of the twelve presidents of the South American countries, the region con-
cluded it necessary to create a South American agreement that longs for a convergence
of the subregional trade agreements, which would encompass the status of communi-
cation, transportation, energy complementation, and political concert. If such an ideal
integration takes place, the two54 sub-regional agreements will contribute to achieve
stabilization of the members' economies and to take the first step to vanish unequal
conditions and opportunities among the southern cone's countries. Drawing from the
recent experiences with Argentina and Brazil, conditions seem favorable for continuing
with negotiations on a block-by-block basis and moving ahead toward the formation of
the South American Free Trade Area. It may take a little longer than scheduled, but a
consolidated agreement should exist before the FTAA negotiations conclude in 2005.1
5
Regardless of all the advantages that this integration brings to the region and to the
Andean Community, as a way of expanding its market and enhancing its position in the
economic world, it is necessary to take into account that integration also carries some
disadvantages. In order to succeed in this enterprise and take advantage of the market,
the Andean countries' economies must be able to compete with the southern neighbors.
Due to the past economic crises in Brazil and Ecuador, it is necessary to be prepared-
with integration come fewer obstacles for crisis to flow from market to market without
shield.
MERCOSUR is just one of the agreements in which the Andean Community is
involved. It is important to mention that the United States is the principal trading
49. Bolivia signed a Free Trade Agreement with MERCOSUR in December of 1996. Based on this
Agreement (No. 36), Bolivia will continue to participate in the negotiations as an Andean
Community member and will harmonize both agreements. The agreements are available at
http://www.mercosur.com/es/info/acuerdo-niercosur-bolivia.jsp.
50. Acts, Declarations, and Agreements, supra note 48.
51. Partial Economic Complementation Accord between the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina, and the member countries of the Andean Community, art.
9, available at http://www.comunidadandina.orglingles/who/crono.htm.
52. Id. ann. V.
53. Id. arts. 20-21.
54. 1 include Chile as part of MERCOSUR for economic reasons.
55. See Reinoso, supra note 25.
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partner of the Andean Community, 6 which is also involved in trade agreements with
the European Union. 7
IV. The FTAA's Chance for Survival
In the last decade, the integration process in the Americas has witnessed a rapid pace
in which subregional and bilateral agreements have developed. This process has as an
ultimate goal the integration of the countries in the international economy and the build-
ing of a third trade block of the world. The process in which the Americas are involved
is based on an open regionalism and the need for convergence of the several trade
agreements between the parties. Open regionalism refers to a process that is intended to
reconcile "the interdependence that stems from special, preferential agreements, and that
which basically arises from the market signals that are produced by trade liberalization
in general"'5  What open regionalism seeks to accomplish is to make explicit integra-
tion policies compatible with, and complementary to, policies that enhance international
competitiveness, and build a more open and transparent international economy. The
agreements should tend to eliminate barriers and liberalize trade with third parties.5 9
In this context, the subregional and bilateral agreements are not just an end but also a
path for hemispheric integration.6 ° The agreements strengthen the relations among the
members and open commerce to the world.
In 1994, at the Miami Summit of the Americas, 34 countries agreed to the creation
of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas by 2005. This aspiration is a continuum of
President George H. Bush's administration (Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI)),
which was designed to create a free trade zone extending from Anchorage to Tierra del
Fuego. It was a direct precursor of NAFTA based on (1) reduction of trade barriers, (2)
increase of investment into the region, and (3) debt relief.6 The EAI encouraged the
rapid development of trade agreements in Latin America because it believed that these
agreements would break down trade barriers among the Latin American countries before
entering into negotiations with the United States.62
56. See ANDEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, available
at http://www.comunidadandina.org/english/relations/relausa2.htm; STATISTICS OF TRADE
BETWEEN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1990-2000
(Feb. 2001), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/english/stadis/excsum/usacan/
usa can.htm.
57. See ANDEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, RELATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/english/relations/rela_ue2.htm.
58. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Open Regionalism in
Latin America and the Caribbean-Economic Integration as a Contribution to Changing Pro-
duction Patterns with Social Equity (Sept. 1994), available at http://www.eclac.cl.
59. See id.
60. See Cisar Gaviria, Trade and Economic Integration in the Andean Region, in THE ANDEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES, TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS IN THE 1990s
(Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patricia Correa and Barbara Kotschwar eds. 1998).
61. See Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under
a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARv. INT'L L.I. 127 (1995).
62. See id.
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At this point in time, where the proliferation of trade agreements within Latin
America is the agenda of the day, we must ask ourselves if the current agreements forecast
the possibility of a future harmonization to achieve the most ambitious enterprise of the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas or are a mere obstacle to it. Is it ideal to think
that with the majority of the Latin American countries involved in at least one form of
trade agreement, be it free trade zones or custom unions, the path to the FTAA is clear?
Nonetheless, the reality is much more complex than this. Each subregional, multilateral,
and bilateral arrangement has been established to accomplish different goals without
addressing the issues of the whole region. These tailored agreements have established
their own laws and bodies that carry out the objectives of the members.
The Latin American Economic System has identified four categories of agreements
in the Americas: free trade agreements, custom unions, free trade zones, and tariff pref-
erence agreements. 63 Among the custom unions, we find the MERCOSUR, CARICOM,
CACM, and the Andean Community. The free trade agreements include NAFTA, the
G-3, and agreements between CARICOM and Venezuela, Venezuela and CACM, Bolivia
and MERCOSUR, and Chile and MERCOSUR as free trade zones. Additionally, there
are multiple bilateral agreements. Mexico's free trade agreements with Costa Rica and
Bolivia and Chile's agreements with Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Colombia are a few examples.
Because of the variety of associations and sub-regional integration to be achieved,
the consummation of an FTAA could be more difficult than expected. Some of the
agreements overlap and are developing at a different pace. Overlapping makes uncertain
the schedules for tariff reduction, can create inconsistencies among the dispute resolution
mechanisms, and makes difficult the implementation of rules of origin, increasing the
likelihood of jurisdictional dispute.64
Additionally, the goals of Latin American countries and the United States are con-
siderably different. While the United States has focused merely on the economic and
trade aspects of the agreement, 6s Latin American countries have tried to develop an
integration process that encompasses a greater degree of cooperation than mere removal
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Furthermore, some organizations with supra-
national power and some without it can be significantly contradictory in terms.66 The
legal developments in each agreement occur at a different pace and have unique goals
in mind. An FTAA approach requires the elimination of legal, political, and economic
obstacles, but the lack of coordination of the sub-regional agreements tends to eliminate
the possibility of a harmonized movement towards the FTAA.
63. See LAES, THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. The bilateral agreements are available at http://Ianic.utexas.
edu/-sela/docs/c122di38.htm.
64. Otero-Lathrop, supra note 6, at 116.
65. Harriet Babbit, Remarks at the Organization of American States (OAS) Ceremony, Latin Am.
Regional Rep.: Caribbean & Central Am., LATIN AM. NEWSL. LTD., LONDON, Jan. 27, 1994,
at 8.
66. This will constitute an accession process parallel to that of the eastern European countries
in the European Union. See Frank J. Garcia, Americas Agreements'. . . An Interim Stage in
Building the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997).
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A. THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACCESSION
At first glance, the future of the integration process seems to reside in a political
leadership that concentrates in an integrated center. This could be either NAFTA or
MERCOSUR, since both involve the strongest economies in the Americas.67
With the enactment of NAFTA, President Bill Clinton's administration stressed that
it was only a milestone in the process to a regional integration.6" NAFTA has proven
that power definitely lies in the destruction of all barriers, be they economic, political,
or legal. NAFTA, of course, does not intend to abolish cultural dichotomies between
the participating countries (the United States, Canada, and Mexico), nor does it seek
total political equanimity between them. It is rather obvious that the United States, the
world's (and NAFTA's) unchallenged economic superpower, has had an enormous role
in the creation of this free trade agreement and will not relent its cause until most, if
not all, American countries participate in a larger free trade agreement, the FTAA.
For a time, the possibility of accession to NAFTA and the possibility of this agree-
ment as the vehicle to the FTAA69 seemed plausible, as Chile was preparing to join in.
However, the negotiations did not come to the expected end and now, after negotiations
have cooled off and U.S. passivity regarding the subject is evident, the FTAA process
must realize that this path is a tedious one that imposes difficult standards to get in
tune with the members. One alternative to building NAFTA as the centerfold of the
process will be to negotiate an interim association stage in the FTAA process. One way
to better coordinate the ongoing integration processes of the countries not yet ready for
NAFTA accession7" is to build a pre-NAFTA relation with its members and work towards
achieving the accession.
Additionally, with the rising of other Latin American trade blocks, NAFTA's posi-
tion as the master of ceremony could be taken. MERCOSUR exemplifies the potential
rival of NAFTA, as shown by taking in Chile as an associate member.7' Furthermore,
MERCOSUR has made Bolivia an associated member as well, building a new bridge
between the countries.7" Mexico will become the third associate and the Andean Com-
m..nitv wll Qtr nathpn its relaio,,c" ,-,;tF, M/? 'I EIPCOSUP anA f-he "e1 ,lr"7
67. "Any attempt at economic integration will surely affect each of these existing regional groups,
but it seems clear that the roles of NAFTA and MERCOSUR will not be ignored in the
process. These two organizations are prominent in the current state of attempted economic
integration, and some contend that one of these two groups will be the main vehicle through
which the FTAA, and consequently a unified hemisphere, will be achieved." Lisa Anderson,
Comment, The Future of Hemispheric Free Trade: Towards a Unified Hemisphere? Hous. J.
INT'L L. 635, 642 (1998) (citing James Stamps, Free Trade Area for the Americas: Chile is the
Linchpin, MEX. TRADE & L. REP. (Oct. 1995)).
68. See Ron Brown, Remarks at Commerce Department Budget Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 7,
1994.
69. See O'Hop, supra note 61.
70. See id.
71. See Chile loins Southern Cone Common Market as Andean Nations Agree to Multilateral Free-
Trade Negotiations with MERCOSUR, NOTISUR-LATIN AM. POL. AFFAIRS, Oct. 4, 1996.
72. See Mario Osava, MERCOSUR: Integration Deepens, But Andean Expansion Stalls, INTER PRESS
SERV., Dec. 12, 1996.
73. See Abraham Lama, Latin America-Integration: Steady, Slow Moves Towards "Super Bloc,"
INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 26, 1996.
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thus liberalizing trade between the South American countries, an important step in the
road to the FTAA.
However, as NAFTAs standards for accession have proven burdensome, the
MERCOSUR alternative is not without criticism. Notwithstanding economic success,
MERCOSUR has not developed institutions and bodies to be the master of this enter-
prise. The region may be better off addressing the issue as one of integration, rather
than one of accession to the dominant market forces in the hemisphere.
B. THE ALTERNATIVE OF CONVERGENCE
To accomplish an FTAA, flexibility and convergence are the keys. The pending chal-
lenge of the open regionalism is to cause the convergence between the different schemes
of integration. In the countries of this region, this task would move economies more
toward open international trade, macroeconomic stability, competitiveness of its pro-
ductive structures, and would reinforce the power of negotiation in an increasingly
interdependent world."4
The convergence of the processes of sub-regional and bilateral integration towards
a regional and soon hemispheric free trade zone, as proposed, has to advance in the
commercial area, in the norms and instruments of commercial policy, and in other
complementary areas. All the processes of integration are sustained in the final objective
to converge towards hemispheric integration. Therefore, it is foreseeable to suppose that
during the next years, an approach between the different schemes to integration will
have to happen. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the process of continental
integration will advance, paralleled in the deepening of each sub-regional scheme, and
in its mutual approach, and these will have a point of encounter in the FTAA.
Andean Community participation in the negotiations to create an FTAA bears wit-
ness to the efforts of Community member countries to coordinate their international
trading relations more closely. Their active participation has elected them to important
positions in the FTAA negotiating process, including three chairmanships and two vice-
chairmanships of negotiating groups. Moreover, they now speak with a single voice in
each negotiating group.75
The FTAA means a market of 780 million inhabitants, US$10 million of GDP (which
accounts for one-third of the world's GDP), and more than 20 percent of global trade.
In 1999, 65 percent of the Andean Community exports (FOB) were destined to FTAA
countries and 60 percent of its imports (CIF) originated in the same FTAA market, the
principal source of the economic trade of the Community.76 The Andean Community
has realized the enormous value of this process and the meaning of it for the independent
economies of the countries, thus charging with its institutional force to be sure that the
FTAA is achieved.
74. PERMANENT SELA SECRETARIAT, THE REGIONAL CONVERGENCE PROCESS AND THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF THE FTAA (trans.), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/-sela/docs/rrgpcd4.htm.
75. SEBASTIAN ALEGRETT, THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH THE HEMISPHERE (Nov.
17, 1998), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/alegrettll -nov-98.htm.
76. SEBASTIAN ALEGRETT, LA PARTICIPACI6N DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA EN EL ALCA
FoRo NACIONAL-ALCA/PERO LIMA (Feb. 1, 2001) (trans.), available at http://www.
comunidadandina.org.
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With its agreements with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community will be sure to have
gained an enormous bargaining power when negotiating with the United States in the
FTAA framework. As such, they will have gained all the other custom unions and free
trade agreements within Latin America. This is not a David vs. Goliath economic battle
anymore, but "David" is still a long way from being a giant.
C. CONCLUSION
It is important to emphasize that in its infancy the FTAA would not promote a
free mobilization of people across borders. As mentioned before in the section on the
Andean Pact, a struggling economic nation would like to see the flight of citizens to
a more advanced nation. The FTAA's focus lies in the elimination of trade barriers. Its
message is primarily economic, and, as such, there must be a continuous agreement to
further struggling economies and promote the development of unexplored lands.
For the FTAA to work, there must be an agreement to not only develop legislation,
but to also create an enforcing agency that will see that legislation is consistently enforced.
One of the great South American legal problems is the lack of effective legislation.
Advanced laws are not often carried out. One of the main roles of the FTAA would be to
create a legal agency, without political creed or national affiliation, to enforce established
rules and laws.
A future FTAA would also benefit from unrivalled domestic and foreign imports.
The unifying economic power of all American countries would create a consistent system
of domestic imports and foreign exports to quench a need for internal sustenance and
external trade. An unchallenged economy based on the dollar would heighten the great
economic development of third world nations. It would also solidify the legal trading
structure among the FTAA countries.
As long as the FTAA does not seek to interfere with internal cultural and political
conflicts that do not affect the economic safety of the member countries, the multilateral
agrcciiinint has a ci6 tt afliLif t chancel Outo sur'..- -A l~f A--1 ilt- ITi- +I- ti_ -ltitt ~ I,
cultural and political identification along the board, were the members to seek cultural
unification within the block (which would entail the dismissal of cultural relativism),
were the members to go past economic realities and seek extra-financial requisites for
FTAA unity, then real misunderstandings and subsequent problems would probably arise.
Along with the internal correspondent agreements between NAFTA, the Andean Com-
munity, MERCOSUR, and the rest, the creation of the FTAA will without a doubt be a
tremendous undertaking. Strenuous, yet satisfying; risky, yet rewarding; these are some
of the adjectives that describe the creation of this future free trade agreement.
V. Conclusion
Evidently, the economic integration processes that Latin America, and particularly
the Andean Community are carrying out are quite considerable in size and scope. The
goal of establishing the Common Market by 2005 requires compromises from the mem-
ber countries and their political, religious, cultural, and economic ambassadors. With
the member countries' current economic and political situations, it is hard to predict if
there will be a time extension for this ultimate goal. The development in the negotiations
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with the MERCOSUR members brings a light on the horizon for increasing economic
welfare, as well as attracting more investments and acquiring an extended market for
products. One can just wonder if Bolivar's dream can come true now that the Americas
are a long way from a well-established and developed free trade agreement. In the mean-
time, each member country will have to sacrifice and compromise because that is the
price of union and the impulse of globalization.
The overlapping agreements between each of the member countries could play a
substantial role in the slowdown of the FTAA's fruition. The fact that right now differ-
ent American countries are involved in different trade agreements is a reality that the
FTAA has to consider. A positive aspect of these starting agreements is the fact that the
member countries are engaged in basic trade agreements. MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community are small baby steps towards a great unification of all American nations.
Within a great casserole of economic progress, the FTAA, if properly conducted, has the
potential to create better independent states.

